US-DPRK war of nerves

Students of world politics are watching a good case study of the utility of bluff and flattery in international relations which seem to be the only tools available to the Trump administration, at least for now, in its push to change the behaviour of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) otherwise called North Korea.  The carrier strike force, as awesome as it looks, avails little.  And anyone familiar with the politics of the Korean peninsula knows that the US “armada,” as President Trump called it, is bluff.
The massive demonstration of fire power by the joint US-South Korea war games was a spectacle.  But across the 38th Parallel, the array of DPRK long range artillery show must be nerve-wracking for South Koreans who were graphically shown how their city, Seoul, would be leveled  to the ground in an hour or so should their neighbour to the North feel militarily threatened.
President Trump did not attempt to invoke “the Madman Theory” in the confrontation because, with an unpredictable North Korea on the other side of the gambling table, it might be the equivalent of a reckless betting of the house in a very unfamiliar turf.
No one knows how the tension in Korea would thaw but it is obvious Mr. Trump is not comfortable where he is, which is clearly the origin of the second option, flattery, so he flatters the two leaders who could make the tension go away – Chinese President Xi Jinping, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.  President Xi, Trump said, is trying very hard to diffuse the situation and call North Korea to order.  “He certainly doesn’t want to see turmoil and death.  He doesn’t want to see it.  President Xi is a gentleman who wants to do the right thing.”
As for Kim Jong Un, Trump crowed, “he’s 27 years old.  His father dies, (he) took over a regime.  So, say what you want, but that is not easy, especially at that age.  I’m not giving him credit I’m just saying that’s a very hard thing to do… so obviously he’s a pretty smart cookie.”  US Secretary of State Tillerson piled more compliments on the dictator: “All indications, Bret, by intelligence agencies are that he is not crazy…And indications are in the past that when certain events have happened, he has taken – made rational choices.”  Then last Monday Mr. Trump capped it, and went even further, “if it would be appropriate for me to meet him, I would absolutely, I would be honoured to do it.”
It may be true that both President Xi and Kim Jong Un have not returned the compliments.  But they need not.  The purpose of the flattery is to create the necessary condition to dial back on the brinkmanship created in the minds of many that a war is imminent.  Secondly, the US having realized that the Chinese are loathe to do the heavy lifting in North Korea, must have decided that a fresh round of face-to-face negotiation with the North Koreans might be a better and, possibly, a quicker solution to the problem.
The two sides see the issue of nuclear weapons development from diametrically opposite angles.  For North Korea, it is the key to their continued existence as an independent state free from intimidation and threats by other powers, including the United States.  They cannot give up their weapons programmes because they can cite examples of the fate of all those who gave up their weapons, usually described as unilateral disarmament.  They cite the case of Iraq.
If Saddam had not handed over his weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the US invasion of 2003 probably would have not happened. They also cite the case of Col. Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, who also handed over his weapons.  If he had kept them, even the air attacks on Libya to help the revolutionaries in 2011 may not have happened.
They know the US would not wish to place even a single US city at risk of a nuclear strike over a dispute with North Korea.  Indeed, the US would not even contemplate putting Seoul, at risk.  Now the key to deter US aggression, in DPRK’s strategic calculation, is a quick development of intercontinental ballistic missiles which can deliver its already developed nuclear weapons, no matter how crude they are at present, into continental US cities, even at the fringes, like Hawaii.  The US is working on the knowledge that the DPRK is not yet in a position to do an ICBM.
The North Korean missile tests have not been too successful.  But the North Koreans know the rule: if you try and don’t succeed, try, try, try again.  And that is what they’ve been doing, and that is why they are unwilling to listen to anyone, not even China.  So, both sides are racing against time.
The Chinese would glibly say they don’t understand why North Koreans need nuclear weapons.  But that is only partly true because many of the components, the chassis, the computers, some missile materials were sold the North Koreans by China. China is DPRK’s best friend in the world, its protector if not its guardian, its comrade if not always its teacher.  The Trump administration is hoping that China would do its bidding in North Korea in order to gain better trade terms.  That is most unlikely for two reasons. First, the Chinese have a long memory.
They are not going to forget that it took the United States 30 years before it grudgingly recognized the Peoples Republic of China as a legitimate member of the comity of nations.  China is not going to forget that the North Koreans fought gallantly side-by-side in the Peoples Liberation Army (Red Army) in the Chinese war of independence.  The Chinese were so grateful for their help that they let the North Koreans return home with their weapons after 1949.  Thus it was no surprise that the Chinese entered the Korean War without hesitation to save the North Koreans from the onslaught of  UN Forces when the UN crossed the Yalu River in 1950.
Chinese entry changed the course of the Korean War and the forces returned to the status quo ante, where they have been since 1946.  Both sides have been close for 70 years, and have fought together, bled together, and unlikely to dramatically alter their relationship just to make Donald Trump “happy.”