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The judiciary cannot continue to operate as though we remain in an era when judgments spoke only to lawyers through printed law reports several years after delivery. The National Judicial Policy itself contemplates the establishment of public enlightenment units to explain the workings of the judiciary to citizens. That provision has become even more important in the social-media era. Courts must communicate better. I equally recall the Body of Benchers in a committee I served adopting this posture also. This does not mean judges should engage in Twitter, or X, arguments with litigants. Certainly not. Neither should judicial officers begin explaining their judgments on Facebook Live. The dignity of judicial office requires restraint.
What is needed is professional institutional communication. This much we have contended for a while now without concrete action taken. Important judgments should be made available promptly, and elementary explanation of content done. Court orders should be accessible in authentic form. Where false reports concerning procedural events circulate, court information departments should be capable of correcting objective inaccuracies without discussing the merits of pending cases. Cause lists should be digitised. Judgments should progressively become searchable online. Approved recordings or transcripts of important proceedings should become easier to obtain. In fact, I believe all recordings or transcripts must be open to the public. The more inaccessible authentic information is, the easier it becomes for misinformation to flourish.Nature, as the saying goes, abhors a vacuum. Information does too. Where a judgment of 150 pages is unavailable to the public for weeks, somebody’s ten-line WhatsApp interpretation becomes the de facto judgment.
Where a ruling cannot be obtained, a partisan blogger tells society what the judge allegedly said. Within hours, thousands of citizens may be debating words that were never uttered. Technology therefore presents not only a threat but an opportunity. The National Judicial Policy already encourages greater use of information and communication technology, including digital recording, transcription, legal research and electronic case-management mechanisms.
The judiciary should accelerate that transition. If social media has compressed the information cycle to minutes, our justice institutions cannot continue communicating on the timetable of another century. Another group that must interrogate its conduct is the legal profession.Lawyers are officers in the temple of justice. We are advocates, certainly, but advocacy has boundaries. A lawyer should not lose in court in the morning and attempt to reverse the ruling on social media by evening through attacks on the judicial officer. Neither should counsel deliberately disclose selective portions of proceedings in order to mobilise public hostility against the other side. Increasingly, we see lawyers granting interviews on matters still being tried, presenting their client’s version as though judgment had already been delivered. Others circulate processes filed in court accompanied by triumphant headlines. Some petitions appear online almost contemporaneously with, or sometimes before, their delivery to the authority expected to consider them.This culture must be examined.
A court process is not an allegation merely because it bears a court stamp. A statement of claim is not a judgment. An affidavit is not necessarily truth simply because it was sworn. A charge sheet does not establish guilt. A petition does not establish misconduct. Yet social-media audiences understandably struggle to maintain those distinctions when legal practitioners themselves blur them. The National Judicial Policy contains particularly strict provisions concerning allegations of judicial misconduct. It states, among other things, that complaints or allegations against judicial officers or court employees submitted for investigation should not be leaked or published in the media, and it sets out consequences where such complaints are leaked or publicly discussed. Whatever one’s view about the breadth or desirability of those provisions, the philosophy behind them is obvious: disciplinary processes must not be converted into instruments of media intimidation, or persecution.
There is also the question of contempt of court and the broader doctrine traditionally captured by the expression sub judice. I appreciate that freedom of expression remains constitutionally protected and that judicial proceedings, except in recognised circumstances, are generally conducted publicly. Courts are not secret societies and judges are not immune from criticism. In fact, constructive criticism of judgments is essential to the development of law. As lawyers, academics and citizens, we must be able to say respectfully that a judgment is wrongly reasoned, inconsistent with precedent or damaging to constitutional values. Appellate adjudication itself proceeds on the recognition that judges can err. The danger begins when criticism moves from analysing judicial reasoning into interfering with the adjudicatory process. Nobody should be permitted to manufacture evidence online.Nobody should threaten witnesses because of the testimony they may give. Nobody should intimidate judges into deciding cases in a predetermined direction. Nobody should deliberately circulate false information designed to destroy the credibility of judicial proceedings. Freedom of expression is precious, but so is the right to a fair trial.
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Neither constitutional value should automatically swallow the other. This conversation becomes even more complicated because of the phenomenon of fake news, manipulated photographs, edited recordings, artificial intelligence and deepfakes. We are entering an era where seeing may no longer be believing. An audio recording allegedly containing the voice of a judge, lawyer or litigant can be artificially generated.
A photograph can be manipulated. A video can be edited outside its context. Documents can be fabricated with remarkable visual precision. Imagine the implications for justice administration. A fabricated recording released on the eve of judgment could create the impression that a judge had been bribed. A manipulated video could appear to show a witness making an inconsistent statement. A fake court order could circulate widely before the court registry has the opportunity to deny it. A fictitious quotation attributed to a judge could ignite public anger within minutes. Our justice system must prepare for this reality now rather than after serious damage occurs. Digital literacy can no longer be treated as an optional skill for judicial officers, lawyers, investigators and court administrators. We must equally recognise that online misconduct is not wholly beyond the reach of Nigerian law. The Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) legislation was amended in 2024, including amendments to section 24 dealing with categories of prohibited communications. The amended language covers, among other things, certain messages known to be false where transmitted for specified harmful purposes such as causing a breakdown of law and order or posing a threat to life.
However, caution is required here. We must not respond to social-media abuse by creating a culture in which every criticism of government, public institutions or judicial decisions becomes criminalised. That would be equally dangerous. The solution to irresponsible speech is not authoritarian suppression of legitimate speech. There must be proportionality, legality and respect for constitutional freedoms. Criticism is not cybercrime merely because it is uncomfortable. Satire is not criminality merely because the powerful dislike it.Public officers must develop thicker skins than private individuals because accountability comes with public responsibility.
At the same time, citizens must understand that freedom of expression does not confer immunity for defamation, threats, deliberate falsehoods or conduct calculated to obstruct justice.Rights carry responsibilities. A democratic society that values free speech must equally undertake the demanding task of nurturing responsible speech.Another danger is selective outrage. Our attitude to justice increasingly depends on whose ox is gored. When social-media attacks target a judge whose decision favours us, we condemn the attackers. When the same tactics are deployed against a judge whose decision displeases us, we join the chorus. That hypocrisy is destructive. Institutions survive only when principles are defended even when inconvenient. A true democrat must defend the presumption of innocence of an opponent just as vigorously as that of a friend. A true lawyer must resist intimidation of a judge even where he believes the judge is wrong. A responsible citizen must condemn misinformation even when the falsehood benefits his preferred political cause. If our principles change with our interests, then they are not principles; they are conveniences.Another area requiring urgent reflection is the relationship between law enforcement agencies and the media. I have never been comfortable with the routine parade of suspects before cameras prior to trial. Apart from the implications for dignity and the presumption of innocence, the practice encourages society to regard arrest as proof of guilt. The danger becomes greater when such footage circulates permanently on social media.
Glad that this is being tamed by the appropriate authorities already. Investigating institutions ought to communicate facts necessary for public safety and accountability, but prosecution must take place in court and not at press conferences. Evidence should first persuade the judge, not influencers. A prosecutor who possesses a good case does not need social-media conviction.Conversely, social media has become valuable in exposing genuine shortcomings in justice delivery. Citizens complain online about missing court files, endless adjournments, abusive police conduct, unaffordable legal representation and other obstacles to justice. Institutions should not dismiss all such criticism as hostility. Some of it is invaluable feedback.The NJC’s policy itself recognises delays, efficiency concerns and weakening public confidence as problems requiring attention, and it proposes performance tracking, case-flow management, case monitoring, greater use of technology and strategies for reducing excessive delays. Therefore, the judiciary must not demand public confidence as though confidence is a constitutional entitlement. Confidence must be earned. When simple cases last fifteen years, social media will complain. When contradictory orders emerge from courts of coordinate jurisdiction, citizens will ask questions. When politically exposed persons appear to obtain quicker judicial attention than ordinary citizens, suspicions will arise. When allegations of misconduct are not transparently resolved within reasonable time, rumours will fill the vacuum. The judiciary must therefore distinguish between attacks that threaten its independence and criticism that exposes legitimate institutional weaknesses. One must not become an excuse for ignoring the other. The best defence against misinformation is often credible information. The best defence against allegations of arbitrariness is transparent procedure. The best answer to claims of judicial incompetence is consistently well-reasoned judgment. The strongest armour against public suspicion is integrity. Social media did not create every problem facing Nigerian justice. It merely magnifies many of them. If there is delay, social media magnifies it. If there is corruption, social media broadcasts it. If there is conflicting jurisprudence, social media ridicules it. If there is an excellent judgment, social media can equally celebrate and disseminate it. The technology therefore behaves somewhat like a mirror. Breaking the mirror will not remove every blemish on the face.
What then must be done? First, there must be sustained public education on the meaning of judicial proceedings. Citizens need to understand the difference between arrest, arraignment, trial and conviction. They need to understand that bail is not acquittal, that an interim order is not necessarily final judgment, and that an appeal is part of the judicial process rather than evidence that the lower court was corrupt. Second, the judiciary must embrace strategic communication without compromising judicial restraint. Every superior court should have a professionally staffed communication and publicenlightenment unit. Authentic judgments and significant rulings should be published expeditiously.Third, lawyers must rediscover professional restraint. Litigation should not become an online popularity contest. Counsel should argue before judges rather than social media followers. Fourth, law-enforcement agencies and prosecutors must avoid unnecessarily prejudicial publicity. The citizen whom government accuses remains constitutionally presumed innocent until the legal burden has been discharged. Fifth, media houses and online publishers must distinguish reporting from adjudication. Headlines should not convict persons whom courts have not convicted. Sixth, our justice institutions must develop protocols for dealing with deepfakes, fabricated court documents and other forms of digitally manipulated evidence or misinformation. Seventh, citizens themselves must cultivate restraint. Before forwarding that sensational allegation about a judge, lawyer, witness or litigant, pause sufficiently to ask whether it is true, whether the matter is pending, and whether publication may unjustly damage somebody or interfere with proceedings. There is an African wisdom that the person who throws stones into the marketplace may not know whose relative will be struck. Justice belongs to all of us. Today, social-media hysteria may be directed against a public figure we dislike. Tomorrow, it may be our brother, daughter, business partner or ourselves standing accused. At that moment, we will suddenly appreciate why civilisation created courts, rules of evidence, presumption of innocence, impartial judges and the right to be heard. These safeguards were not invented to protect criminals. They were invented to protect society from the dangers of arbitrary judgment. For me, the central issue is balance. We cannot, and must not, silence social media in the name of protecting justice. Social media has become an integral part of modern democratic expression and accountability. Neither can we allow the digital mob to supplant courts established by law.The courthouse and the public square have different functions.
The public square may ask questions. It may investigate. It may criticise. It may advocate reform. It may expose wrongdoing. But when the question is whether a particular person is legally guilty, whether a contract has been breached, whether an election was validly conducted, whether evidence proves an offence, or what consequence the law attaches to contested facts, civilisation has assigned that responsibility to the courts. We therefore must resist the gradual emergence of two parallel judicial systems in Nigeria: one constituted under the Constitution and another constituted by hashtags. The latter is faster, louder and perhaps more entertaining. But speed is not justice. Popularity is not evidence. Virality is not proof. And one million retweets cannot lawfully substitute for one credible exhibit properly admitted and evaluated by a competent court. Ultimately, social media should become a partner in justice delivery rather than its competitor. It should illuminate rather than intimidate. It should educate rather than misinform. It should hold institutions accountable without destroying the institutional framework upon which everybody’s rights ultimately depend.
Our courts themselves must also earn the confidence necessary to withstand the storms of digital opinion. Independence cannot become a shield for indolence, and judicial dignity cannot become an excuse for institutional opacity. The responsibility therefore rests on everybody: judges, lawyers, law-enforcement agencies, journalists, bloggers, political actors and ordinary citizens. Justice is too precious to be surrendered either to secrecy in the courthouse or hysteria in cyberspace. As I conclude, let us remember that civilisation is measured not by how loudly we condemn those we believe to be wrong but by whether we are prepared to accord even the unpopular person the benefit of due process. When social media points out injustice, let us listen. When it exposes corruption, let institutions investigate. When it criticises questionable judgments, let the legal community respond with reason. But when it seeks to replace evidence with emotion, procedure with propaganda and judges with influencers, we must draw the line.For if the day comes when guilt is determined by trending opinion rather than admissible evidence, and judges begin looking over their shoulders at social media before writing judgments, it will no longer be only the judiciary that is endangered. Justice itself will be on trial. And when justice is on trial, every citizen is potentially in the dock.
