State police: Weighing Nigeria’s security needs against risk of political capture

Nigeria’s renewed push to establish state police has reopened one of the country’s most consequential constitutional debates, pitching the urgent need to confront worsening insecurity against persistent fears that decentralised policing could become a potent weapon in the hands of political leaders.

The controversy has gathered unprecedented momentum following President Bola Tinubu’s endorsement of the State Police Bill currently before the National Assembly, a move many regard as the boldest step yet towards fundamentally restructuring Nigeria’s policing architecture. For supporters, the proposal represents an overdue reform capable of addressing the glaring deficiencies of the country’s highly centralised police system.

For critics, however, the idea raises profound questions about the future of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law if state governments are permitted to exercise control over armed law enforcement agencies.

The debate has become even more intense amid growing concern over alleged political misuse of existing policing institutions. The Rule of Law and Accountability Advocacy Centre recently called on the Inspector General of Police to investigate allegations that criminal justice processes are being deployed against perceived political opponents in Enugu State. According to the organisation, reports from lawyers, citizens and political actors suggest an emerging pattern in which investigations, arrests, detention and prosecutions are allegedly being used to intimidate individuals because of their political affiliations, opinions or criticism of government officials.

Although the centre emphasised that every allegation of crime deserves proper investigation, it warned that law enforcement agencies must never become instruments for settling political disputes. The organisation urged the Inspector General of Police to conduct an independent review of politically sensitive complaints, while calling on the Police Service Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, the Nigerian Bar Association and civil society organisations to safeguard the neutrality and professionalism of Nigeria’s policing institutions. For many observers, the allegations reinforce longstanding concerns surrounding the proposed creation of state police.

Supporters of state police argue that Nigeria’s security realities have outgrown the country’s centralised policing model. Banditry in the North West, terrorism in the North East, kidnapping across the Middle Belt and South East, oil theft in the Niger Delta, and communal conflict and urban crime more generally, all require rapid, locally informed responses that a command structure headquartered in Abuja often struggles to provide.

Among the strongest advocates is Ondo State Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Dr Kayode Ajulo SAN, who describes state police as a constitutional necessity rather than a political choice. According to him, genuine federalism requires constituent states to possess the capacity to maintain law and order within their territories.

Ajulo argues that Nigeria’s population of over 200 million people, spread across diverse cultural, geographical and security environments, cannot effectively be policed through a single, centrally controlled command structure. Drawing on the experience of the Amotekun Corps in the South West, he maintains that decentralised policing enhances intelligence gathering, strengthens community trust and allows quicker responses to emerging security threats. He commends the Federal Government for supporting constitutional reforms that would move policing to the Concurrent Legislative List, allowing both federal and state police structures to coexist while maintaining national standards.

However, he cautions that constitutional amendments alone cannot guarantee success. According to him, issues such as funding, recruitment, operational coordination, training standards and accountability mechanisms must be comprehensively addressed through implementing legislation.

Despite widespread acknowledgement that Nigeria’s security architecture requires urgent reform, concerns over possible abuse remain significant. Critics argue that governors already wield enormous political influence within their states and may be tempted to deploy state police against opposition politicians, journalists, activists and civil society groups.

Some constitutional lawyers warn that while complaints about political interference in the federal police have persisted for decades, decentralisation could merely relocate the problem from Abuja to the thirty six state capitals. They fear that politically exposed governors could use state police to frustrate opposition campaigns, influence elections, suppress dissent and initiate questionable criminal prosecutions against critics.

The recent concerns raised by the accountability centre have therefore become central to the national conversation. For opponents of state police, they serve as a reminder that institutions, rather than structures alone, determine whether policing protects democracy or undermines it. Ajulo acknowledges these fears but insists they should inspire stronger safeguards rather than outright rejection of the proposal.

According to him, abuse of power is possible under every policing model. The answer, he argues, is not to reject state police but to build institutions capable of preventing abuse.

Among the safeguards he recommends are genuinely independent State Police Service Commissions, broader stakeholder representation in oversight bodies, transparent recruitment procedures, judicial review of operational decisions, clearly defined circumstances for federal intervention and nationally uniform standards for professionalism and human rights compliance. He also advocates financial support mechanisms that would enable less affluent states to sustain professional policing without compromising standards.

According to him, federalism must balance autonomy with solidarity.

An APC chieftain, Obafemi George, also believes state police offer one of the most practical solutions to Nigeria’s persistent insecurity. He notes the contradiction in the current constitutional arrangement whereby governors are designated as chief security officers of their states yet exercise no operational control over the police responsible for maintaining public order. George argues that decentralised policing would significantly improve intelligence gathering, deepen collaboration between communities and security agencies, and enable faster responses to local threats.

Like other proponents, however, he concedes that fears of abuse cannot be dismissed. No democratic institution, he argues, is entirely immune from abuse. What matters, according to him, is whether effective constitutional safeguards exist to deter misconduct while preserving the enormous benefits of decentralised policing.

Drawing comparisons with the United States, George observes that state policing has existed for well over a century and continues to function because of strong oversight institutions, independent courts and clear accountability mechanisms. He therefore urges lawmakers to ensure that Nigeria’s constitutional framework incorporates similar checks and balances capable of insulating state police from political manipulation.

Beyond political concerns lies perhaps the biggest practical challenge, that of funding. Policing is expensive. Personnel recruitment, training, forensic capabilities, technology, communications, logistics, intelligence gathering, welfare and modern equipment all require enormous financial commitment. While wealthier states may be able to sustain effective police services, poorer states could struggle. Ajulo describes funding as the Achilles heel of the reform and recommends equalisation mechanisms, performance based grants and other financial support arrangements to ensure no state becomes incapable of providing adequate security because of limited resources.

Governance experts generally agree that the success of state police will depend less on the concept itself than on the legal architecture supporting it. Among the safeguards widely proposed are independent State Police Service Commissions insulated from political influence, transparent recruitment and promotion systems, guaranteed security of tenure for senior officers, judicial oversight of arrests and prosecutions, independent complaints commissions, legislative supervision by state assemblies, federal monitoring of constitutional compliance and severe penalties for abuse of office.

Others recommend constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting governors from issuing operational directives in politically sensitive matters, while ensuring that command decisions remain subject to professional policing standards rather than partisan interests.

Security analysts also point out that policing works best when officers understand the communities they serve. Locally recruited officers are often better positioned to gather intelligence, appreciate cultural dynamics and build trust than personnel posted from distant locations with limited knowledge of local realities. This, supporters argue, is precisely where state police can outperform the existing centralised structure.

Civil society organisations nevertheless insist that constitutional rights must remain at the heart of every policing reform. They argue that freedom of expression, political participation, peaceful assembly, fair hearing and protection from arbitrary arrest must never become casualties of efforts to improve public security.

As Nigeria moves closer to another electoral cycle, lawmakers face one of the most significant constitutional decisions since the return to democratic rule in 1999. The challenge extends beyond deciding whether state police should exist. The real test is whether Nigeria can design a policing framework that strengthens security without weakening democracy, protects citizens without empowering political intimidation, and advances federalism without compromising the rule of law. On that fundamental principle, both advocates and sceptics appear to agree.

Whether policing remains federal or becomes decentralised, its legitimacy will ultimately depend not on who controls it but on whether it remains impartial, professional, accountable and firmly anchored to the Constitution rather than to political interests.