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Except the United States, the other thirteen nations that participated in the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference were Europeans. No African nation was present at the troubleshooting gathering where African territories were partitioned among the then great powers, in what was referred to as the ‘Scramble for Africa’. France got most of her colonies in West Africa and deployed ‘Francafrique’ to tighten its rein even after 60 years of granting political independence. Be that as it may, the centre started loosening because of unmet expectations.
Nonetheless, Emmanuel Macron, the youthful 25th president of France has been soldering on despite the unprecedented headwind from the MPs at the home front and the increasing alienation by some old allies abroad. He has hosted some powerful global and regional news makers in his strategic calculation to reposition his country, following direct and indirect threats to France’s sphere of influence. These are deft diplomatic moves. The rebuilding of Notre-Dame Cathedral gutted by fire in April 2019 and the successful hosting of 2024 Olympics are strong positives for his administration.
But France’s dwindling grip, especially in West Africa, has raised strategic concerns. From the get-go, Macron was faced with a tattered reputation of France in Africa. And to craft a new narrative, he opted for a decoy of reaching out to African non-state actors in the former colonies: entrepreneurs, youths, artists, researchers, and the diaspora community. Hence, he hosted what was termed the New African-France Summit in October 2021 at Montpellier with no African head of state invited. Rather, it was the non-state actors totaling 3,000 people that were invited. This happened for the first time since 1973. The purpose was to articulate “new format, new actors and new themes” for a more rewarding relationship between Africa and France, and “to offer new generations a new framework for reflection and action.” For me, this was an impetus to the voices of young people, but the strategic vacuum occasioned by Macron’s neo-liberal fixation in his reformative relationship with Africa, turned out a diplomatic gaffe.
The waning trust of French West Africa in Macron’s ‘politics of memory, aid reform, and less military-centred approach’ was not an overnight build-up. Three defining developments were instructive. First, the rhetoric of changing Franc CFA to Eco – (discontinuing the 50% deposit obligation in the central bank reserves of France and France’s non-membership of supervisory agencies of West Africa Economic and Monetary Union) were undermined by pegging of the currency to Euro, as well as France’s “continued guarantee of the fixed exchange rate. Second, Macron’s frequent visits and diversification of economic interests with Anglophone countries – Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Africa, raised eyebrows in the francophone West Africa. This was complicated by a striking discovery that “only a third of France’s exports to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) go to UEMOA countries.” Nigeria alone accounts for 20% of trade with France in SSA.
The third point is President Macron’s declaration in Ouagadougou summit held on November 28, 2017, that “There is no longer French African Policy! The end of Operation Barkhane with the withdrawal of the French troops in Burkina Faso and Mali in 2022 was the last straw that broke the camel’s back and widened the security gaps. With the understanding of the near-absolute powers of France president in matters of foreign policy and in security deployments abroad, it signaled a denouement of protection of the Sahel by France.
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The growing anti-France sentiments got congealed and sparked outrage. In the words of Hugh Schofield, “When people are deeply buried in an injustice or discrimination, they find it hard to see the bigger picture. Small improvements are all that can be expected and are welcomed. Only when people begin to imagine a full emancipation, do they perceive the full extent of their subjection. And they get angrier.”
As such, the resurgence of coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger were seen as a revolt against France. The coups were popular on the streets. It was like second independence celebrations. The countries immediately severed security ties with France and formed of a defence pact – Alliance of Sahel States. In another devastating blow, Chad and Senegal ended their military cooperation with France and asked France to remove her military bases out of the two countries. Meanwhile, Russia cashed in on the massive disenchantment and security crises in Sahel to forge new strategic relationships with the former French colonies. In essence, what France had built for over a century turned into a fiasco.
Still reeling from the bruises, Macron attuned his diplomatic antenna and extended invitation to Nigeria’s president. The two countries have now struck broader economic links that would likely confer a strategic ally in West Africa to Nigeria. The state visit to France afforded the opportunity to sign a Memorandum of Understanding between Nigeria and France in exploitation of strategic solid minerals like copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements, which are very valuable in clean technologies. There were other agreements on research. training and Franco-Nigeria student exchanges that would facilitate skills transfer. Also, the MOUs on “the promotion of sustainable mining practices” to mitigate the risks on the environmental ecosystem in line with climate action, is germane.
However, beyond the optics of France’s damage-limiting overtures to Nigeria and other Anglophone countries, Nigeria should be on the alert and maximize the full opportunities. Already, the International Energy Agency had predicted that “appetite for lithium, copper, cobalt, nickel, graphite and rare earths will grow by up to 350% from 2022 to 2030.” Thus, the country should understudy the challenges faced by countries like Australia, Chile, and China who are the leading producers. Like Norway did in its early years of oil exploration, indigenous skills transfer by the technical partners and companies that produce the renewable products must be the irreducible minimum. Ultimately, the big lesson from the experience of France with her former colonies is that there is always a day of reckoning.
