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The political dust generated by the recently concluded party primaries is yet to settle. As expected, several disputes have already found their ways to the courts, while many more are waiting in the wings. Among the numerous legal controversies that have emerged, one appears particularly novel and capable of reshaping Nigeria’s electoral jurisprudence. It concerns the apparent conflict between the list of successful aspirants recorded by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) during its statutory monitoring of party primaries and the names eventually submitted by political parties as their sponsored candidates.The controversy has understandably generated anxiety among aspirants and the electorate alike. Some aspirants insist that they genuinely won the primaries conducted by their political parties under the watchful eyes of INEC officials. Yet, when the official list of candidates was eventually transmitted to the Commission, their names had disappeared, replaced by those of other individuals. Others contend that the list submitted by the political party is the only list recognised by law irrespective of what transpired at the primary election itself.
The inevitable question therefore is this: where there is a conflict between the monitoring report prepared by INEC and the list eventually submitted by the political party, which should prevail?At first impression, the answer appears deceptively simple. However, upon a closer examination of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Electoral Act 2026, and the decisions of our superior courts, one quickly discovers that the issue is far more complex than many imagine.
The Electoral Act still maintained the earlier reform of mandatory monitoring of the political parties’ primaries intended to strengthen internal party democracy. This requirement, which is expected to be fundamental, demands that the parties must give INEC at least twenty-one days’ notice of any convention, congress, conference or meeting convened for the purpose of nominating candidates. This requirement is contained in Section 82 of the Electoral Act which provides thus:
“(1) Every registered political party shall give the Commission at least 21 days’ notice of any convention, congress, conference or meeting convened for the purpose of electing members of its executive committees, other governing bodies or nominating candidates for any of the elective offices or “merger” specified under this Act.
(2) The notice shall specify the date, time, venue, and names of the members of the Congress, convention or conference committee as spelt out in the party’s Constitution.(3) The Commission, with or without prior notice to the political party, shall attend and observe any convention, congress, conference or meeting which is convened by a political party for the purpose of —Electing members of its executive committees or other governing bodies; Electing candidates for an election at any level;
(6) Failure of a political party to notify the Commission as stated in subsections (1) and (2) shall render the primaries, convention, congress, and conferences invalid.”
The purpose is obvious. INEC is expected to deploy officials to observe the exercise and independently verify compliance with the law and the party’s own guidelines.
This monitoring function is not a ceremonial exercise. It is a statutory duty imposed upon the Commission by the National Assembly. The monitoring report prepared by INEC is therefore intended to serve as an objective and independent record of what actually transpired during the primary election. It records whether the primary was conducted, whether due process was substantially followed, who participated, the votes scored, and the aspirant who emerged. One is therefore compelled to ask: if the report generated by INEC can simply be ignored whenever a political party submits a different name, what then is the practical value of the elaborate monitoring process prescribed by law? Parliament could hardly have intended such an absurdity. On the other hand, the Constitution introduces another dimension that cannot be overlooked. Sections 65, 106, 131 and 177 of the Constitution prescribe the qualification requirements for election into the various elective offices, while Sections 66, 107, 137 and 182 set out the grounds for disqualification. More fundamentally, Sections 221 and 222 recognise political parties as the only constitutionally authorised vehicles for sponsoring candidates for elective offices. In Nigeria, individuals do not contest elections in their personal capacities. Political parties contest elections through candidates whom they sponsor.
Section 65 of the Constitution provides:
(2) A person shall be qualified for election under subsection (1) of this section if:
(a) he has been educated up to at least School Certificate level or its equivalent; and
(b) he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that party”
Section 221 of the Constitution provides:
“221. No association, other than a political party, shall canvass for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at an election.”
Section 222 provides for modalities and restrictions and formation of political parties. Consequently, sponsorship remains an indispensable constitutional requirement. It follows that no matter how successful an aspirant may have been at a primary election, his emergence alone does not automatically place his name on the ballot. The political party must formally sponsor him by submitting his name to INEC within the period prescribed by law. It is precisely at this intersection that the present legal dilemma arises. Can a person whose victory was recorded by INEC during the monitoring exercise be said to have become the sponsored candidate where the political party deliberately refuses to submit his name? Conversely, can a political party, after conducting a primary election under INEC’s supervision, simply ignore its outcome and submit another person’s name without legal consequences?
The Electoral Act itself appears to discourage such arbitrariness. Sections 29 and 33 regulate the submission and substitution of candidates. Section 33 is particularly significant because it drastically limits substitution after valid primaries to recognised statutory exceptions, principally death or voluntary withdrawal within the stipulated time. The era when political parties freely substituted candidates after primaries was one of the mischiefs the Electoral Act sought to eliminate.
The courts have equally travelled a long distance in protecting internal party democracy. In S.D.P. v. I.N.E.C. [2023] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1905) 499 at 539, paras. C – E, the Supreme Court held thus:
“Then, the National Assembly, in exercise of its constitutional powers to make laws under section 4(1) & of the Constitution, enacted the Electoral Act, 2022 to provide for the conduct of elections, generally, as provided for in the Constitution, including the processes of selection and nomination of candidates by political parties for the elections, Both the Constitution and Electoral Act,2022, have no provision for independent candidates for elections in the country and so the political parties have the monopoly to select and nominate candidates they intend to sponsor for such elections and for candidates to be eligible to contest elections in Nigeria, they have to be sponsored by a registered political party”
In Amaechi v. INEC [2008] 5 NWLR (Pt.1080) 227, the Supreme Court delivered one of the most revolutionary decisions in Nigeria’s electoral history when it held that elections belong to political parties but that political parties cannot act outside the law. The Court famously observed that it is the political party that wins an election, yet it refused to reward an unlawful substitution of a candidate who had legitimately emerged from the primary process. Although the facts of Amaechi arose under a different statutory regime and before the current Electoral Act, the principle that unlawful substitution cannot be judicially endorsed remains of enduring importance.
Similarly, in A.P.C. v. Marafa [2020] 6 NWLR (Pt. 1721) 383 at 434. Paras F – G, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that political parties must strictly comply with both their constitutions and the Electoral Act in the conduct of their primaries. Failure to do so carries grave legal consequences, sometimes extending beyond the fortunes of individual aspirants to the validity of the party’s participation in the election itself. Likewise, in Lado v. CPC (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt 1279) 689 at 736, para A – C, the Supreme Court upheld the same position. In essence, the Supreme Court reiterated that while nomination of candidates ordinarily remains an internal affair of political parties, courts acquire jurisdiction once allegations of non-compliance with statutory provisions or party guidelines arise. The autonomy enjoyed by political parties is therefore not absolute. It exists within the confines of the Constitution and the Electoral Act. Numerous subsequent decisions, including PDP v. Ezeonwuka [2018] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 187 at 252, and other pre-election cases decided under Section 285 of the Constitution, have consistently reinforced one central proposition: political parties are bound by their own constitutions, their guidelines and the Electoral Act. They cannot choose which provisions to obey and which to disregard. These authorities, however, stop short of answering the precise question presently confronting us. None of them directly considered the legal consequence of a conflict between INEC’s monitoring report and the list eventually submitted by the political party under the provisions of the Electoral Act. This is therefore a relatively fresh frontier in Nigerian electoral law. In my respectful opinion, neither extreme position represents the correct legal approach. To hold that the list submitted by the political party must invariably prevail would render INEC’s statutory monitoring function meaningless. Such an interpretation would permit political parties to conduct transparent primaries under the observation of INEC only to discard the authentic winners and substitute preferred candidates thereafter. Such an outcome would undermine the very objective of the Electoral Act, which is to strengthen internal democracy and eliminate impunity. That is why the Supreme Court in Atuma v. APC (2023) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1910) 371 at 413, paras. F-H held that “Where a political party has made its choice of which candidate to nominate by a valid primary election, it cannot arbitrarily change that candidate or cancel the primary election for no just reason. Such a political party does not have a discretion on whether to submit the name of a successful aspirant to the Independent National Electoral Commission, it is compulsory that the name of the winner is submitted. The political party cannot submit the name of another person to the Independent National Electoral Commission or conduct another primary election for no cogent reason.” We also refer to Abdullahi v. Argungu (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1895) 289 at P. 311, paras. D-G.
Conversely, to hold that INEC’s monitoring report automatically constitutes sponsorship may equally stretch the law beyond its present limits. INEC monitors primaries; it does not nominate candidates. The constitutional power of sponsorship remains vested in political parties. The Commission cannot, by its monitoring report alone, transform an aspirant into a sponsored candidate without the legal acts required of the political party. The more harmonious approach is to recognise that the Constitution and the Electoral Act must be read together rather than in isolation as done by the Supreme Court in Atuma’s case. The Constitution gives political parties the power to sponsor candidates. The Electoral Act regulates how that power must be exercised. Accordingly, where a political party exercises its constitutional power contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Electoral Act, its action cannot enjoy constitutional immunity. Constitutional powers are never intended to legitimise illegality. The role of the courts therefore becomes indispensable. Where an aspirant demonstrates that he lawfully emerged from a primary election conducted in accordance with the party constitution, party guidelines and the Electoral Act, and where INEC’s independent monitoring report corroborates that position, the court will be invited to determine whether the subsequent submission of another person’s name amounts to an unlawful substitution prohibited by law. The challenge however is usually where the political parties hide under, and I dare say, manipulate its internal appellate process to tamper with the original list by way of determination of disputes or petitions by aggrieved aspirants. It is thus, judicial determination, not the unilateral assertion of either INEC or the political party, that will ultimately resolve the controversy.
Indeed, I foresee that this issue may eventually come up at the Supreme Court, where the apex court will have another opportunity to enrich Nigeria’s electoral jurisprudence by harmonising the constitutional concept of sponsorship with the statutory objective of safeguarding internal party democracy. The larger issue transcends the fortunes of individual aspirants. It concerns the credibility of our democratic process. If political parties can freely disregard the outcome of primaries witnessed by the electoral umpire, confidence in internal democracy will steadily erode. On the other hand, if statutory monitoring by INEC is stripped of all legal significance, one must legitimately question why the National Assembly imposed that obligation in the first place. Ultimately, democracy is sustained not merely by elections but by fidelity to the rule of law. Every institution created by law must be allowed to perform the function assigned to it. Political parties must exercise their constitutional powers responsibly. INEC must discharge its statutory responsibilities impartially. Above all, the judiciary must continue to serve as the impartial guardian of constitutionalism by ensuring that neither political expediency nor institutional convenience triumphs over legality. As matters presently stand, therefore, it would be unsafe to proclaim the absolute supremacy of either list. The decisive question will always remain whether the political party complied with the Constitution, the Electoral Act, its own constitution and guidelines, and whether the evidence, particularly the independent monitoring report prepared by INEC, establishes that the person eventually submitted is truly the lawful product of a valid primary election. Until the Supreme Court pronounces definitively on this issue with such clarity as regards the particular approach to adopt, the controversy will remain one of the most important and closely watched legal battles on the road to the 2027 general election
