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• As battle moves to state assemblies, security experts list conditions for successful take off
By Omoniyi Salaudeen
A new legislative framework is taking shape in Nigeria to shift the country from a centralised police system to state-controlled policing. The constitutional amendment passed by the National Assembly now moves the debate to the states’ Houses of Assembly. The structural limits of centralised policing sit at the heart of Nigeria’s current insecurity. Because policing has long been controlled almost exclusively from Abuja, a bottleneck forms when responding to highly localised threats: banditry and kidnapping in the North-West, Boko Haram in the North-East, and farmer-herder clashes in the North-Central and South. The federal police are also overstretched and underfunded. Officers are often deployed to communities where they don’t speak the language or know the terrain, making intelligence gathering difficult. That crisis has pushed Nigeria to a constitutional tipping point.
After decades of debate, the Senate has now passed the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Alteration) (State Police) Bill, 2026. If 24 state Houses of Assembly endorse it, Nigeria will see its most far-reaching security reform since 1999. The bill creates a constitutional basis for autonomous State Police Services while preserving a Federal Police Service with clear powers to intervene when national security is threatened.
With this development, policing ceases to be the exclusive duty of a centrally controlled federal institution. Under the new law, states can establish, fund, and recruit their own personnel, subject to national minimum standards. At the same time, the Federal Police Service retains responsibility for terrorism, cybercrime, organised crime, arms trafficking, border security, and inter-state crimes.
Experts say this dual structure creates as much risk as opportunity. Legislation is not implementation. Nigeria’s reform history shows that good intentions without detailed transition plans often create new problems. To avoid administrative chaos or the political weaponisation of local forces, they argue a rigorous, phased transition is vital.
Security expert Patrick Agbambu, however, questions the entire premise. Speaking to Sunday Sun, he said Nigeria does not need a state police, but a decentralisation process that allows Deputy Inspectors-General of Police and Assistant Inspectors-General of Police to function effectively in their zones. “I don’t think creating a state police is what we need if we are serious about solving insecurity in this country. Establishing state police will not solve our problem. Let us not be deceived. State police have not worked in any country,” he argued.
Agbambu noted that advocates say state police will take policing closer to the people. “That is true. There is a need to take the police closer to the people. But is state police the solution? No,” he maintained. He further pointed to Nigeria’s past experiments: “We had a regional police system in the First Republic. The Babangida regime also experimented with something akin to state police when officers were ordered to return to their states of origin. It failed because communities without their own policemen were oppressed. The government had to discontinue it.”
For most stakeholders, the National Assembly must now work with the Police Service Commission on four issues: standardised training, clear jurisdictions, sustainable funding, and independent oversight. Without effective coordination, they warn, this historic shift risks becoming another missed opportunity. According to them, the transition will only succeed if it passes three tests: legal, capacity, and trust.
The legal framework
As passed by the Senate, the bill answers the biggest jurisdictional question. The Federal Police Service handles national crimes and threats. State police services enforce state laws, maintain public order, and protect lives and property within their states. That separation is the foundation for a seamless transition. Agbambu, however, insists “it is not about who takes control.” He said: “We have governors who work seamlessly with their commissioners of police. A commissioner of police can say no to a governor who asks him to do something unconstitutional or to target the opposition.”
The bill also requires each state House of Assembly to enact its own State Police Service law and obtain certification that national standards are met before operations begin. This prevents a chaotic rush to launch. It also creates a reconstituted National Police Council to coordinate policy and cooperation between federal and state institutions. Safeguards for federal intervention are central. Under the new law, the Federal Police Service can temporarily assume command of a state police during an actual or imminent breakdown of order, a national security threat, serious administrative incapacity, or evidence of partisan, ethnic, religious, or sectional persecution. But this requires presidential authorisation, Senate oversight, and judicial review. That three-layer check addresses fears of federal overreach while protecting states from abuse. State Commissioners of Police will also change. Unlike now, where the Inspector-General deploys them, governors will appoint CPs on the recommendation of the National Police Council. Removal requires legislative approval by the State House of Assembly. The design balances state control with federal oversight.
Governor Uba Sani of Kaduna defended the safeguards on a national television programme. “You can appoint the commissioner of police, but you cannot sack him. Not even the State Assembly can sack him alone. It requires approval from the Police Service Commission or National Police Council, plus the National Assembly and State Assembly. The safeguards against abuse are in the Act.”
The next stage is state ratification. A constitutional amendment does not need all 36 State Houses of Assembly; it requires a two-thirds majority, or at least 24 states, before it goes to President Bola Tinubu for assent. Most states are expected to pass the bill quickly. States in the South-West, which pioneered Amotekun, the North-Central, and parts of the North-West and South-East facing severe banditry, kidnapping, and communal clashes have been the loudest advocates for decentralised policing. The Nigeria Governors’ Forum has broadly backed the shift, arguing that a centralised command in Abuja is overstretched and ill-equipped for local intelligence.
Even so, some analysts expect a few State Houses of Assembly to stall or debate the bill over two concerns: cost and political weaponisation. Security expert Jackson Olalekan-Ojo put it bluntly to Sunday Sun: “Will officers be paid like civil servants? Will their salaries come as and when due? Will they be used as political thugs? Will they be used to witch-hunt opponents? Those are the questions we must answer. If these questions are not properly answered, we will be enacting a law that produces lawlessness.”
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Establishing, equipping, training, and paying a state police force is a major fiscal commitment. Smaller states with low internally generated revenue that rely heavily on federal allocations may balk, especially in the current economic climate. Lawmakers in states with vocal opposition or deep distrust of the governor may also hesitate. Despite safeguards built into the bill, including Section 17(7) which forbids state police from targeting political critics or opponents, critics worry governors will still use local forces to intimidate rivals.
Capacity and funding
The bill acknowledges capacity gaps upfront: “No state would be permitted to commence operational policing until such service is certified as meeting prescribed national standards.” That certification clause is the key transition tool. It forces states to prove funding, training, and equipment before officers hit the streets. According to available data, Nigeria spends about $3.5 billion yearly on the current police force. The bill empowers states to fund their own services, but fiscal reality means poorer states will struggle. Agbambu raised the funding question directly: “According to the IGP, the existing police will be split 60-40. The federal police will retain 40 per cent, while 60 per cent will go to the states. If the federal government pays a policeman N100,000, will Ondo or Anambra be willing, or able, to pay the same?”
He warned that many states already owe civil servants months of salaries: “You cannot arm a man and then owe him two or three months’ salary. You will create anarchy.”
His recommendation: “Let the federal government cede a percentage of revenue allocation to the states so they have enough to carry out these new responsibilities.”
Olalekan-Ojo echoed the inequality risk: “Each state knows its funding capacity. Lagos may recruit 200,000 officers. Oyo may recruit 50,000. The numbers may differ, but salaries and other remuneration should be uniform. I do not want a situation where rich states are well policed while poor states are not, forcing criminals to migrate to poorly policed states.” To prevent this, he proposed: “The federal government can create a ‘state police equalisation fund’ to support poorer states.” Without a federal funding formula or minimum budget benchmark, Nigeria risks a two-tier system where wealthier states have modern forces and poorer states have underpaid constables. Experts argue that inequality itself becomes a security threat as criminals migrate to weaker states.
The bill also creates State Police Service Commissions to handle recruitment, promotion, and discipline. This is the firewall against sons-of-the-soil quotas and the political enlistment of thugs. Agbambu also flagged duplication: “Many states already have security outfits. In the South-West, for example, you have Amotekun in several states, while Lagos has the Neighbourhood Watch. If we now create another state police, we will be duplicating structures. Will Amotekun be merged into the state police? For me, we are not getting it right.”
He also faulted the timing: “The President set up a committee to work on state police. That committee is still sitting. It has not submitted its recommendations, yet both chambers have already passed a bill.”
For a seamless transition, the National Police Council must set one national curriculum delivered through a central academy and state command schools, so every officer learns the same use-of-force rules and investigation standards.
Personnel is the most sensitive issue. The bill replaces the Nigeria Police Force with a Federal Police Service. Stakeholders insist rebranding must include a clear absorption plan for the existing 370,000 officers, plus Amotekun, NSCDC, and vigilantes already on the ground. Vetting must remove bad actors while retaining experience to avoid a security vacuum. Olalekan-Ojo outlined how recruitment should work: “The Nigeria Police should handle it, with the DSS involved in profiling and the military supporting training. The DSS must conduct background checks first. After that, there should be a proper interview, jointly conducted by the police and DSS. Only those who scale through should be recruited.”
He added: “We must change their mentality and orientation. We must re-indoctrinate them. If that is done, we can say we have the right personnel.” He cautioned against rushing: “We should be looking at nine to ten months before this can take off. It is like a seed. You cannot plant it today and expect fruit in a week.”
Public trust
Public trust in the police sits below 30 per cent. The bill tries to rebuild it through structure. The appointment and removal process for CPs, plus independent State Police Service Commissions, insulates officers from direct governor control. The provision for federal intervention when state police are used for partisan persecution also acts as a deterrent against misuse. But law alone does not create legitimacy. The transition must deliver real community policing: officers recruited from the LGAs they serve, speaking local languages, and gathering intelligence through trust. Digital case files and mandatory NHRC audits should be part of the national minimum standards the National Assembly prescribes.
Agbambu’s view is that funding and welfare, not structure, are the real issues: “The biggest challenge facing the Nigeria Police today is not directives from the IGP. It is remuneration, tools to work, welfare, and morale. Will state police solve these? I doubt it,” he concluded.
#EndSARS showed that abuse by any police unit can trigger a national crisis. The bill’s standards must include a ‘never again’ clause for SARS-style units. The bill also requires Senate oversight and judicial review for any federal takeover of state police. That transparency is essential to public confidence. Citizens need to know intervention is legal, not political. The 2026 bill gets three things right: it creates the dual structure, it sets national standards before launch, and it builds safeguards for federal intervention and state independence. Those are the blueprints for a seamless transition. But blueprints don’t build houses. As 36 state assemblies domesticate the law and seek certification, Nigeria must focus on the details the bill mandates: funding formulas, uniform training, independent commissions, and clear communication to citizens. If the bill’s standards are strictly adhered to, state police can become the reform that finally matches security architecture to Nigeria’s size and complexity. If the process is rushed, oversight is skipped, or recruitment is politicised, the bill will not deliver 37 professional forces. It will deliver 37 armed factions. Now that the Senate has passed the bill, the real test begins: can Nigeria implement what it has legislated?
Concerns
The Senate’s hasty passage has reignited debate over the risks of state police. Supporters argue it removes the need to wait for operational clearance from Abuja. By bringing security closer to the people, they say, it can foster mutual trust. Officers who understand local languages, geography, and cultural dynamics, they add, will gather intelligence more effectively. Critics and human rights advocates warn of the opposite. State governors, they say, could use local forces to suppress political opponents or minorities. There are also questions about whether poorer states can afford to train, equip, and sustain a modern police force. Another concern is operational clashes between state and federal police. The only safeguard, they argue, is clear legal boundaries to prevent jurisdictional turf wars. The bill already answers some of these concerns. But many still question the speed of passage. Senator Ali Ndume told a television network he supports state police, but not the rushed process: “I support state police wholeheartedly. But the Senate is supposed to be mature and deliberate. I’m not comfortable with the President bringing anything and we just rush to pass it. I voted for the bill. My concern is the intricacies — the legal implications, funding, and how it will operate.”
Prof. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu criticised the passage without a public hearing. On X, he wrote: “They say Nigeria needs state police to work. The Senate passed a bill for that in minutes, without publishing it or holding a public hearing. The plan is transparent: establish state police before 2027 and hand APC governors lawful militias. That is how to make state police work!”
