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The Sun Nigeria

Inside Dallah bail ruling: due process, cybercrime law shaped judicial discretion

Ibrahim Kabiru Dallah

Ibrahim Kabiru Dallah

From Abel Leonard, Lafia

The refusal of bail to Ibrahim Kabiru Dallah by the Federal High Court sitting in Lafia, Nasarawa State, has gone beyond a routine interlocutory ruling to become a reference point in discussions on criminal procedure, cybercrime prosecution, and the careful balance courts must maintain between constitutional rights and the demands of justice.

In a ruling obtained by our correspondent at the Federal High Court, Lafia, Nasarawa State, and delivered on Friday, 12 December 2025, by Justice M.O. Olajuwon, in Suit No: FHC/LF/285C/2025 between the Commissioner of Police and Ibrahim Kabiru Dallah, the court’s decision was not anchored on emotion, public sentiment, or the social status of the parties involved. Rather, it rested squarely on procedure, evidential law, and the long-settled principles governing bail in Nigeria.

Although bail remains a constitutionally recognised right, the court made it clear that it is not automatic and cannot be granted in the absence of credible and admissible materials placed before it.

The charges and legal background

Dallah is standing trial on charges instituted by the Commissioner of Police under the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act. The allegations, as outlined by the prosecution, border on cyberbullying, online harassment, and related digital conduct allegedly carried out through social media platforms.

In advancing its case, the prosecution maintained that cybercrime is a criminal offence recognised under Nigerian law and warned that such offences, by their very nature, are capable of repetition if not properly curtailed.

The police further alleged that forensic analysis of the defendant’s online activities revealed patterns of conduct that could undermine public order and place witnesses at risk if the defendant were released on bail.

While the court did not determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant at this stage, it acknowledged that the charges before it were criminal in nature and fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.

Bail as a matter of discretion, not entitlement

Justice Olajuwon, in the ruling, reaffirmed the settled position of Nigerian law that bail is at the discretion of the court, a discretion that must be exercised judiciously and judicially.

“I have carefully considered the bail application. The issue for determination is whether the Defendant/Applicant has placed sufficient materials before this court warranting the exercise of its discretion in his favour,” the judge held.

He listed the guiding principles for the grant of bail to include the nature of the offence, the severity of punishment upon conviction, the likelihood of the defendant absconding, interfering with investigation, committing another offence while on bail, or failing to appear for trial.

The court emphasised that bail is not meant to punish an accused person, nor should it be refused as a form of pre-trial sanction. However, the responsibility rests on the applicant to place before the court materials that justify the favourable exercise of discretion.

The central defect: the affidavit in support

At the core of the ruling was the affidavit in support of the bail application. Rather than being sworn to by the defendant himself or by his counsel on record, Baba Ayiwulu Baba, the affidavit was deposed to by a litigation secretary in the defence law firm.

The litigation secretary claimed to have obtained his information from one of the counsel handling the matter, who was said to have been “briefed” by an unnamed person. Justice Olajuwon found this chain of information legally unacceptable.

By relying on Section 115(1) and (4) of the Evidence Act, the court held that affidavits must contain facts within the personal knowledge of the deponent or, where information is derived from another source, must clearly disclose the source of that information.

“The litigation secretary got his information from a counsel who got his information from an unknown person,” the judge ruled.

“Not only is the information received by the litigation secretary hearsay, even the hearsay evidence came from an unnamed person.”

The court stressed that hearsay evidence is inadmissible under Nigerian law and lacks probative value.

Why paragraph four was struck out

Justice Olajuwon identified paragraph four of the affidavit as the backbone of the bail application. That paragraph contained assurances that the defendant would not jump bail, would attend trial, would not interfere with investigation, and would provide responsible sureties.

However, the court held that such assurances, when not deposed to by the defendant himself or a person with direct knowledge of the facts, could not be relied upon.

“In view of the foregoing, the necessary facts contained in the affidavit in support of the application, which this court should ordinarily consider in granting bail, are discountenanced,” the judge said.

Once paragraph four was struck out, the court held that there were no sufficient facts remaining upon which it could properly exercise its discretion.

“With paragraph four struck out, there are no adequate facts upon which this court can exercise its discretion in favour of the Defendant/Applicant,” Justice Olajuwon concluded.

Why the application was struck out, not dismissed

Despite refusing bail, the court declined to dismiss the application outright. Instead, it struck it out, leaving room for the defendant to return with a properly constituted application.

Legal analysts say this aspect of the ruling underscores the court’s recognition that bail is primarily to ensure the attendance of an accused person at trial, not to punish.

By striking out the application rather than dismissing it, the court preserved the defendant’s right to reapply, provided the procedural defects are cured.

Prosecution’s position and cybercrime concerns

In opposing bail, the Commissioner of Police filed counter and further affidavits raising concerns about the defendant’s alleged online conduct.

The prosecution alleged that screenshots of the defendant’s social media posts showed persistent cyberbullying and online intimidation, including statements suggesting that incarceration would not deter him.

It further alleged that such conduct placed the prosecution’s key witness in fear and raised the possibility of interference with the administration of justice if bail were granted.

The prosecution argued that cybercrime, unlike some traditional offences, can be committed repeatedly and instantly, making the risk of reoffending a relevant factor in bail considerations.

Clarification on the role of the SSG

Another significant aspect of the ruling was the court’s clarification regarding the role of the Secretary to the Nasarawa State Government (SSG), Dr Labaran Magaji Shuaibu, SAN.

Justice Olajuwon stated clearly that the SSG is only a complainant’s representative and prosecution witness.

“The charge before the court is by the Commissioner of Police who stood for the complainant, Dr Labaran Magaji Shuaibu, SAN,” the court noted.

This clarification was widely seen as necessary, particularly in light of public narratives and social media commentary that had portrayed the SSG as being the one influencing the case on trial.

Divergent professional views

The ruling has generated divergent reactions among legal practitioners and analysts. A senior legal practitioner described the decision as a “strict but correct application of affidavit law.”

“In bail matters, the affidavit is everything. Once the court found that the foundational paragraph was hearsay, it had no legal basis to proceed,” he said.

Another lawyer pointed to the defence’s strategy as the key weakness. “In sensitive applications like bail, the defendant should depose personally, except where there are compelling reasons. Delegating that responsibility to a litigation secretary exposed the application to fatal objections,” he noted.

However, a human rights advocate, Muhammed Usman, offered a more cautious perspective. “While the ruling is legally sound, it also highlights how procedural missteps can temporarily restrict liberty, even in non-capital offences. It is a reminder that access to competent legal drafting is critical,” he said.

Cybercrime law and judicial caution

Digital law experts say the ruling reflects growing judicial awareness of the peculiar nature of cybercrime.

“Cyber offences can be committed from anywhere, at any time, and can escalate rapidly. Courts are increasingly factoring this reality into bail decisions, especially where there is evidence suggesting a likelihood of repeated conduct,” a cyber law analyst explained.

A lesson for legal practice

Beyond the immediate parties, the Dallah ruling has become a cautionary tale for legal practitioners. It reinforces the principle that technical compliance with affidavit requirements is not a mere formality but a substantive aspect of criminal procedure.

For defendants, it explains the importance of placing credible, admissible facts before the court. For counsel, it serves as a reminder that procedural shortcuts can have serious consequences.

Ultimately, the Dallah bail ruling is less about the denial of bail and more about the supremacy of due process.

Justice Olajuwon’s decision illustrates how courts navigate the tension between protecting individual liberty and upholding the integrity of the judicial process, particularly in an era where cybercrime poses evolving challenges.

As the case proceeds to trial or a renewed bail application, one point remains clear: in Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, procedure is not peripheral; it is central, and no matter the offence or the personalities involved, the law demands strict compliance.