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In Nigeria’s political history, it is noted that the country stands on a tripod of Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba. Not even the contemporary geopolitical configuration of South East, South South, South West, North East, North Central and North West, has diminished the tripod political structure history.
However, in recent times, there is a question Nigeria must confront with courage and with all honesty: How come the Igbo, one of the three historically dominant political forces in Nigeria, have become consciously marginalised to the extent that they are now missing in the country’s political calculations? At present, the three top political positions in the country – Presidency, Vice Presidency and Senate Presidency – are occupied by Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and Annang. The Igbo are nowhere to be seen. At the table of political discussions, it is only the Igbo, out of the tripod, that are missing.
Looking at this, the question remains: Why would the Igbo be missing in the echelon of Nigeria’s political strata? Perhaps, the answer cannot be found merely in the performance of individual Igbo politicians. Neither can it be dismissed as another grievance in Nigeria’s endless competition among ethnic groups. There is a deeper structural question about the architecture of Nigerian power and the place that has been assigned, deliberately or otherwise, to the Igbo within it.
For generations, Nigeria’s political history was substantially shaped by three major blocs: the North (Hausa-Fulani), the West (Yoruba) and the East (Igbo). The tripod was never perfectly balanced, and it was repeatedly disrupted by military coups, civil war, constitutional changes and the creation of new states. However, the three-legged structure, nevertheless, captured an important political reality: the Hausa-Fulani political establishment, the Yoruba political establishment and the Igbo political establishment were major centres of national power.
Unfortunately, today, that tripod is visibly unstable. The Igbo leg has been weakened, not necessarily because the Igbo have ceased to possess the population, economic capacity, intellectual resources or entrepreneurial energy to matter, but because the institutional mechanisms through which political influence is converted into national power have progressively worked against the Igbo.
The Igbo have only five states, in the true sense of it. They are the only major ethnic group with that number. The North-West has seven, while the other zones have six each. Since states are important units in Nigeria’s federal representation and distribution arrangements, this numerical disadvantage has consequences for representation in the National Assembly and other federal structures. The problem, therefore, begins before an Igbo politician even enters the contest.
In the Nigeria of today, the tripod has been deliberately reduced to two legs. Where it exists, the southern minorities have been used as the third leg, deliberately making them the third political force in the country. It may look like crying wolf where there is none to claim, without evidence, that there is a secret national conspiracy to permanently exclude the Igbo from power. However, it would be equally irresponsible to pretend that the pattern of exclusion does not exist simply because nobody has produced a document titled “Plan for the Political Displacement of the Igbo.”
It is apparent that the weakening of the Igbo in the political landscape emerged through the cumulative effect of state creation, constituency boundaries delineation, party structures, federal appointments, institutional leadership, security architecture, economic infrastructure and the informal rules governing presidential succession. The effect can be real even when the intention behind every individual decision cannot be established. That distinction is important.
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the presidency has alternated among the Yoruba (South West); Hausa-Fulani (North West) and Ijaw (South South), while the Igbo (South-East) have remained outside the presidency. Yes, in 1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (Yoruba) of the South West was elected president and was in office for eight years. His emergence was significant because in the election that produced him, only candidates from South West contested on the platform of major political parties. 1n 2007, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (Hausa-Fulani) of North West was elected president. He ruled for three years, but, unfortunately, died in office.
Following YarAdua’s death in 2010, his deputy, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, became president, to complete the remaing part of the tenure. In 2011, Jonathan of the Ijaw tribe (South South) was elected president. In 2015, Gen Muhammadu Buhari (Hausa-Fulani) of North West, emereged president. He was in office for eight years. In 2023, Senator Bala Tinubu (Yoruba) of South Wrst was elected president. He has been in office for more than three years and contesting in next year’s presidential election, aiming for eight years of two-terms in office.
This history matters because presidential power in Nigeria is not merely ceremonial. It determines the composition of the executive, influences federal appointments, shapes national priorities and provides enormous leverage over the political system. When an entire geopolitical zone repeatedly finds itself outside the presidential equation, the issue cannot simply be reduced to wounded ethnic pride. It becomes a question of political inclusion.
Nigeria’s Federal Character principle was designed to prevent domination by one section of the country. It is an admirable constitutional idea, even though there is a paradox. If the basic political units used in calculating representation are themselves unequal, formal equality can produce unequal outcomes. A zone with five states begins many political contests from a weaker institutional position than a zone with seven. The difference can translate into fewer representatives, fewer political appointments and less leverage in national bargaining. This is one reason why state creation remains a major political issue in the South-East.
The Igbo political class must accept responsibility as there is another uncomfortable side to this debate. The displacement of the Igbo from the national political centre cannot be blamed entirely on other Nigerians. The Igbo political class bears considerable responsibility. For too long, Igbo politicians have often failed to construct a durable national political strategy. Alliances are frequently transactional. Political parties are entered and abandoned according to immediate calculations. Regional interests are sometimes sacrificed for individual political advancement.
A politician cannot complain about marginalisation in the morning and negotiate away the region’s collective bargaining power in the afternoon. The Igbo need a political philosophy that goes beyond the search for the next presidential ticket. They need a strategy for the next 25 years. That strategy must include political participation across party lines, investment in federal institutions, deliberate cultivation of young political leaders, stronger engagement with other regions and a sustained campaign for constitution reforms that address structural inequities.
The 2023 presidential election introduced another dimension to the country’s political question. Peter Obi, an Igbo candidate running on the Labour Party platform, won the presidential election in several South-Eastern states and became a major national political figure. The Independent National Electoral Commission’s official results provide the underlying electoral record. His candidacy demonstrated that an Igbo politician could mobilise significant support beyond the traditional political structures that had previously dominated presidential politics.
When the Igbo clamour for Peter Obi, therefore, they are not only fighting for inclusion and political relevance but also for competence and ability to deliver. The Igbo believe that the future of Nigeria lies in Igbo presidency, aware that an Igbo president would downplay ethnicity in appointment as seen today and immediate past federal government and promote competence and merit. Therefore, nobody should blame the Igbo for sticking out their necks.
The truth, however, is that the future of Igbo politics cannot be built exclusively on the proposition that the Igbo deserve the presidency because it is “their turn.” Nigerians outside the South-East must also be persuaded that an Igbo presidency serves a broader Nigerian interest. Outside the quest for an Igbo president, the ruling political party – the All Progressives Congress (APC) – ought to look at its zoning arrangement as it affects the Senate Presidency with the historical tripod in mind. The Bola Tinubu presidency, in post-2027, brings an opportunity for the reenactment of the tripod in power distribution. In the event of Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani presidency and vice presidency, the post of Senate President should belong to the Igbo. The established political tripod should be affirmed again.
Nigeria cannot afford a two-legged political equation or the replacement of the Igbo with another leg in the tripid. A stable Nigeria cannot permanently operate on the assumption that two major political blocs should determine the direction of the country while the third is invited periodically to negotiate for inclusion. The country is too complex for that. The Igbo are not guests in Nigeria. They are not beneficiaries of Nigerian citizenship by concession. They are one of the people whose history, sacrifices, businesses, intellectual contributions, military service, journalism, civil service, professional institutions and political struggles helped construct the Nigerian state.
The appropriate response to the Igbo question is therefore neither special privilege nor permanent grievance. It is equal citizenship, fair representation and genuine access to national power. Since the South-East has structural disadvantages, Nigeria should have the courage to examine them. Since federal appointments are unbalanced, the data should be published. Since state creation has produced a representational deficit, the constitutional question should be debated. Since federal projects are distributed unequally, budgets and releases should be compared. Since party structures exclude particular regions, party membership and leadership data should be examined. And if the allegation of deliberate displacement is wrong, let transparent evidence demonstrate that it is wrong.
