Freedom of expression in democracy: Where should law draw the line? (2)

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The inaugural part of this treatise, being necessarily foundational, examined the theoretical foundations of the concept of freedom of speech, after which it examined its framework under our Constitution. Thereafter, we discussed a comparison of the approaches to the concept, starting with the United States.

This second part continues where the first left off: a review of the European and Commonwealth experience, followed by a similar treatment of the broader international and African human rights systems. Next is an examination of the three contested frontiers of Defamation and Sedition, Speech in cyberspace and, finally, Incitement and hate speech. Enjoy.

THE EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH EXPERIENCE

Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees expression in its first paragraph and permits restrictions in its second where they are prescribed by law, where they pursue a listed aim and are necessary in a democratic society (European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, art 10.). In Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737, para 49, the European Court affirmed that the freedom extends to information and ideas that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population such being the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society. In Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407, para 42., it added that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider for politicians than for private individuals. At the same time, the Court allows States a margin of appreciation, and it has upheld liability for online comments that amounted to clearly unlawful hate speech while declining to sustain a conviction for denying the characterization of the Armenian events of 1915 as genocide.

The common law world has followed a middle path. In England, the House of Lords in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL); Defamation Act 2013, s 4., recognised a qualified privilege for responsible journalism on matters of public concern, a development later codified in the public interest defence in the Defamation Act 2013. Lord Steyn famously described free speech as the lifeblood of democracy in a decision upholding the right of prisoners to communicate with journalists (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL).). The Supreme Court of Canada, in R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697. upheld by a narrow majority the criminalization of the willful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group, holding that the harm done to targeted groups and to social harmony justified a measured limit on expression.

 

 

THE INTERNATIONAL AND AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects the freedom of expression and permits restriction only where provided by law and necessary for the respect of the rights or reputations of others or for the protection of national security, public order, public health or morals. Article 20(2) separately requires the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, arts 19(3) and 20(2).

The Human Rights Committee has insisted that restrictions must be necessary and proportionate, that the relationship between the right and its restriction must not be reversed, and that mere insult to public figures does not justify penalties (UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 34: Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (2011) CCPR/C/GC/34, paras 21-36 and 38.). The Rabat Plan of Action usefully refines the threshold for incitement into a six-part test that considers context, the speaker, intent, content and form, the extent of the speech and the likelihood of resulting harm (UN Human Rights Council, ‘Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Religious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence’ (2013) A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, appendix, para 29.).

Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights guarantees every individual the right to receive information and to express and disseminate opinions within the law (African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, art 9.). The African Commission has held that the phrase ‘within the law’ does not license States to defeat the right by ordinary legislation, and in a complaint against Nigeria it condemned the proscription of media houses under military decrees (Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998).). The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights held in Konaté v Burkina Faso App No 004/2013 (African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 5 December 2014), that custodial sentences for defamation are disproportionate and incompatible with the Charter. The Commission’s 2019 Declaration of Principles reinforces the point by calling on States to repeal laws that criminalise sedition, insult and the publication of false news (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (2019) principle 22.).

THREE CONTESTED FRONTIERS

Defamation and Sedition

Defamation is the oldest limit on speech and the one most readily justified by the protection of the reputations of others. The difficulty is not the existence of a remedy but its character. Civil liability, as under the Defamation Law of Lagos State 2007, vindicates reputation through damages and correction and carries no stigma of crime (Defamation Law of Lagos State 2007.). Criminal defamation and sedition, by contrast, place the coercive power of the State at the disposal of the offended and are historically associated with the silencing of critics. The Human Rights Committee has urged States to consider decriminalising defamation and has stated that imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty, and the African Court has agreed (General Comment No 34 (n 27) para 47; Konaté v Burkina Faso (n 31).). A law that punishes the publication of true statements, or that does not distinguish between the private citizen and the public official, fails the necessity test because less intrusive remedies are available. Sedition fares worse. A provision that criminalizes the excitement of disaffection against a government is difficult to reconcile with section 22 of the Constitution, which expressly enjoins the media to hold government accountable to the people.

Speech in Cyberspace

The internet has multiplied both the reach of speech and the temptation to regulate it. Section 24 of the Cybercrimes Act, 2015, criminalized the knowing transmission of messages that were grossly offensive or known to be false for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger or insult, among other things. In Incorporated Trustees of Laws and Rights Awareness Initiatives v Federal Republic of Nigeria, the ECOWAS Court held that the provision violated article 9(2) of the African Charter and article 19(3) of the ICCPR and ordered Nigeria to repeal or amend it (Incorporated Trustees of Laws and Rights Awareness Initiatives v Federal Republic of Nigeria ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/20 [2020] ECOWASCJ 6 (ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 10 July 2020).). The National Assembly responded with the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc) (Amendment) Act 2024, which was signed into law in February 2024 and replaced the vague terms of the original section with a narrower formulation (Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc) (Amendment) Act 2024, s 24.).

The suspension of Twitter in June 2021 raised a different question, namely whether the State may close a channel of communication wholesale. In SERAP v Federal Republic of Nigeria, the ECOWAS Court declared the suspension unlawful and inconsistent with article 9 of the African Charter and article 19 of the ICCPR, treating access to the platform as a derivative of the right to freedom of expression. It directed that such suspension must not be repeated. A blanket prohibition is the least discriminating of all instruments, since it silences the lawful with the unlawful and replaces judicial determination with executive fiat. The same objection attends the proposed Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill 2019, which would have conferred broad powers on government to restrict access to online platforms and to penalize falsehood. This had attracted sustained opposition and was never therefore enacted (Protection from Internet Falsehood and Manipulation and Other Related Matters Bill 2019 (Senate Bill, 2019).). None of this means that cyberspace is lawless. Fraud, cyberstalking, the dissemination of child sexual abuse material and threats of violence are punishable online as offline. The point is that regulation must target defined harms and not the medium.

Incitement and Hate Speech

Here the case for restriction is strongest and the risk of overreach is correspondingly acute. Nigeria is a plural society with a history of ethnic and religious violence in which inflammatory hate speech has sometimes preceded atrocity. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR obliges the State to prohibit advocacy of hatred that constitutes incitement to violence (ICCPR (n 26) art 20(2).). Targeted prohibition of incitement to violence is plainly justifiable under section 45(1) as a measure for public safety and for the protection of the rights of others. Indeed, the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 and the general criminal law and penal code laws already cover many such cases (Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022.).

The danger, however, lies in legislative responses that define hate speech by reference to feelings of insult or by reference to the content of opinion on religion or politics. The National Commission for the Prohibition of Hate Speech (Establishment) Bill 2019 proposed severe penalties, including capital punishment where death resulted. It drew criticism precisely because of the breadth of its definitions (National Commission for the Prohibition of Hate Speech (Establishment) Bill 2019.).

The Rabat threshold (a six-part evaluation framework to know when speech crosses the line of protected speech into illegal incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence under international human rights laws such as Article 20(2) of ICCPR) offers principled alternative, for it requires proof of intent, a realistic likelihood of harm and a context in which the speaker has influence over the audience; and it reserves criminal sanction for the gravest cases.

 

Thoughts for the week

“Freedom of expression – in particular, freedom of the press – guarantees popular participation in the decisions and actions of government, and popular participation is the essence of our democracy”. – Corazon Aquino

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