Kaduna drone tragedy is the unfortunate air attack that killed 120 villagers in Tudun Birni, Kaduna State. The Nigerian Army deployed the drone(s) to fight terrorists but the bombs dropped on a group of villagers enjoying a Muslim festival. Of the sad things reported about this unfortunate bombing, one of the most troubling was a 90-word statement of denial from the Nigerian Air Force.
This statement is worth quoting in full.
“The news making the rounds alleging that Nigerian Air Force (NAF) aircraft accidentally killed innocent civilians in Kaduna is false. Please be informed that the NAF has not carried out any air operations within Kaduna State and environs in the last 24 hours. Also, note that the NAF is not the only organization operating combat armed drones in the northwestern region of Nigeria. It is also important to ensure that due diligence is always exhausted by the media before going to press with unverified and unconfirmed reports. Thank you.”
Although diplomatically worded, the air force message exposed three troubling realities. It betrayed a latent conflict between NAF and the Nigerian Army. It showed that the media have continued with the professional failure of not verifying eyewitness statements before rushing to publish. It delivered an ominous message about coordination in the fight against terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria.
There are two ways to look at this ominous message. One is about responsibility and competence, the other about management and coordination.
Whose responsibility is it to manage unmanned aircraft? Even for a non-military person like me, a cursory search delivers an answer that does the army no good. Remotely piloted military aircraft, aka combat drones, is an aircraft. The nature and sophistication of crimes in the world of growing technology expose two realities about this aircraft. One is that there is a growing demand for more combat drones to minimize human casualties in the military. The other is that, because they are deployed to combat zones and often with potential for collateral damage, there is also a growing demand for qualified pilots to fly them. It is, therefore, safe to say that the killing of an estimated 120 innocent people in Kaduna State was avoidable. Proper coordination between the forces could have improved fidelity of the intelligence that warranted deployment of the drones. And, more importantly, specialists did not pilot the drones. This is not discounting the possibility that the army could have sent some officers to a crash course on how to pilot drones.
Google offers quite a lot of information on how western countries manage theatre operations with the use of combat drones. They have military bases which serve as central command centres. These centres are manned by experienced pilots and aircrew members who control and monitor the drones. Coordination from this central command is critical for seamless and effective operations. In the US, for instance, central command drone pilots guide their drones to provide close-air cover for boots on the ground, gather intelligence, and conduct strategic air strikes. The pilots are officers of the United States Air Force. Could this account for the coldness that was evident in the NAF statement?
This raises the question of why there is more than one military service operating combat armed drones in Nigeria. The only possible explanation is the scramble for hefty defence dollars during the Buhari administration. If this is the case, it would explain why the army may have chosen to sacrifice professionalism on the altar of materialism. One hopes that, in the near future, the land force will not force its way into the waters to try their hands at piloting gunboats.
This would also explain the controversy on the presidential yacht for which Nigerians were bullied into silence by the discordant voices of authority figures. The news was that the President ordered a presidential yacht. Everyone felt offended that government was embarking on the purchase of luxury equipment at a time that the majority of Nigerians (70 percent) had nothing to eat. Presidential spokespersons, federal legislators and the navy all weighed in with rationalisations that shed more confusion than light.
The Presidency denied that it ordered a luxury boat but said the navy did – and under the Buhari Administration. How this therefore appeared in a Tinubu supplementary budget remains a mystery. The Presidency also said what was ordered was not a presidential yacht but a surveillance boat. According to Chief Bayo Onanuga, “What was named as Presidential Yacht in the budget is an operational naval boat with specialised security gadgets suitable for high-profile operational inspection and not for the use of the President.” He did not however explain how a navy request ended up as a budget line in the office of Chief of Staff to the President.
This Presidency’s explanation was, however, more believable than what we heard from Congress. House of Representatives Committee on Navy, taking a cue from the Presidency clarification, dreamt up an inimitable explanation that a presidential yacht is not a luxury craft but a war boat! Committee chairman, Rep. Yusuf Gagdi (APC Plateau), delivered this legend to a newspaper: “I know what a presidential yacht should be. It should be a war yacht that the President uses to go into the water to see the display of national assets that the navy has in terms of ships that fight oil theft, piracy, and all forms of crimes in our water.” Incredible. A yacht is a luxury boat used for pleasure, cruising and for racing.
The explanation from the navy was no less fantastic. Those demanding that the National Assembly withhold approval were told that the presidential yacht had already been delivered to the navy and only needed to be paid for. “The deal for the yacht has been agreed, signed, and delivered but not paid for,” Senate Majority Whip, Ali Ndume (APC Borno) said. Only in Nigeria is it possible for yacht sellers to deliver a N5 billion boat and wait patiently for processing of their payment through the budget process! Who says Nigeria is not credit worthy?
All of this goes to show that the Minister of Defence and Chief of Defence Staff have work to do in managing the forces. Their tasks seem cut out for them already. It is to manage rivalry between and among the land, air and sea forces, each of which may be focused on how much of the Defence Naira and Dollar it could corner. Interservice rivalry is good if it were to lead to improvements in efficiency and effectiveness of each branch. However, there is always the danger that they could become impediments to efficiency in coordination and management of a nation’s defence capabilities. It promotes wastefulness, as we have seen, by allowing branches of the military to procure and deploy the same equipment in one theatre of operations. And it leads to avoidable errors, as seen from the loss of 120 lives in the misdirected drone attack of a Kaduna village.