Looking from a policy analyst’s crystal ball, the future of a Tinubu presidency appears bleak. What is this future, given last week’s conclusion that the administration may not be paying attention to feedback in decision-making? What can we expect if the Tinubu administration continues with its non-transparent decision-making?
The biggest dent to President Bola Tinubu’s image comes from the public understanding how the administration’s policies will positively impact their lives.This is altogether unsurprising; the president did not say much about what he will do during electioneering. Throughout his campaign, Mr. Tinubu refused to outline a policy agenda. He preoccupied himself with putting on an act to fool the northern lobby with his mental and physical competence. Tinubu arrived at the Presidency with, shall we say, an open mind about virtually everything.
Recall that when specifically asked what he would do on gaining power, he offered the following:
“Day 1, hit the ground running; Day 2, continue running; Day 3, don’t rest. Think and do. Select the best team that will help build a better Nigeria. Teamship is crucially important. And giving the people (an) opportunity to exercise their talents.”
It may actually be a strength not to come to office without a burden of expectations or ready to implement a basket of policies that have not passed through the bureaucratic Blackbox. He however converted this potential asset into a weakness by not rising to the occasion as soon as the umpire called his election. INEC declared Tinubu the elected President of Nigeria on 1st March 2023. He had a 90-day window for him to ask for and receive policy briefings from his APC party man that was set to hand over power to him. Nothing stopped him from using this 90-day window to select “the best team that will help build a better Nigeria.” Unfortunately, he wasted the 90 days (1 March – 29 May) and, for good measure, added another three months (30 May – 21 August) before Ministers were deployed. Wasting six months to put a cabinet in place is not reflective of a leader who professed eagerness to hit the ground running from Day 1.
Like other leaders before him, President Tinubu faces the three existential challenges of economic decline, insecurity, and corruption. On the economy, he appointed the Minister of Finance as coordinating minister. The public is however yet to appreciate his outline of a fiscal and monetary policy. From the Ministry, he is yet to outline a coherent fiscal policy. A lot is however happening at the monetary end, principally the Central Bank. But all we see is a struggle to cope with the tools of monetary policy, including management of exchange rate, interest rate, minimum discount rate, and inflation. By accident or design, whatever the CBN is doing is overshadowed by the Emefiele smokescreen.
The result is that most members of the team that Tinubu selected to rebuild Nigeria are either struggling on a steep learning curve or not up to the job. Some have already been caught with their hands in the cookie jar. The President is blindsided by many loyalists who appear to be on a mission to transfer the public treasury into designated private pockets. All of this is possible because President Tinubu decided to follow the footsteps of Buhari on the matter of nepotistic appointments. The feasting and shenanigans of Tinubu’s appointees leave them with little time to design policies for the common good. They also help paint their leader as either unable or unwilling to stop the corruption and stealing. The President appears helpless.
The fuel subsidy removal policy is an example of leadership that appears unwilling to revisit a controversial policy. Rather than tweak this policy to allow the poor to breathe, the administration continues to deploy propaganda to defend it. As we observed last week, because the policy was announced without analysis and in a hurry, it could not have benefited from the prospective feedback that forced the Buhari administration to shy away from implementing it. Without this feedback (most likely included in Buhari’s handover notes), Tinubu’s announcement instantly triggered negative consequences for the economy and for individuals.
In such volatile situations, there are usually options to consider, including setting up a stakeholder committee to review a controversial policy and suggest ways of ameliorating its impact. Jonathan did this in January 2012 when the current president and others sponsored massive protests against a similar fuel price increase. Unlike Jonathan, Tinubu did not proactively manage public expectations, fueling speculations that the regime is out to protect another set of vested interests. State governors are the exposed vested interest because they saw that fuel subsidy removal dramatically boosted their share of revenue from the federation account. The interests lurking in the shadows are yet to be exposed, protected by bureaucrats and other public office holders.
The trouble with using public policy to protect vested interests is that everyone loses from the ensuing scramble to corner the policy benefits. When citizens bear the brunt and cry in vain to have their voices heard, they switch venues to force the leader to pay attention. In Nigeria, organised labour switched venues by embarking on a strike which forced the government back to the negotiating table. In Kenya, youths mounted a protest that forced the government to hurriedly review a proposed tax policy. These incidents happened because the executive branch refuses to listen to citizen feedback in policy making. As long as positive gains of fuel subsidy removal remain elusive and citizens are bearing a heavy burden, all manner of opposition will continue to rear their heads, switching the venues of deliberation to force the leadership to listen and act in the national interest.
Both incidents could have been avoided.
In Nigeria, the President could have set up a committee that includes labour as part of the solution rather than allow them to become the opposition. The administration could also have designed and implemented a citizen engagement programme to sell the benefits of the fuel subsidy removal policy which may not be readily apparent to beneficiaries bearing the policy-induced suffering. A stakeholder engagement project is above the paygrade of current media managers in the presidency. The Minister of Information has the experience and “outsider influence” to successfully oversee One. I however doubt that they will allow him to do so; my experience is that governors prefer to load their State House kinsmen with the propaganda cash that they sooner waste.
There is, however, no guarantee that both solutions will work, for one important reason. The trouble that President Tinubu is experiencing today is partly the consequence of his nepotistic appointments, with concomitant opaque policy decision-making which, in turn, fuels negative rumours and gossip. Only Yoruba irredentists and paid hacks are today bravely defending Mr. President’s policies. I warned on the consequences of Tinubu’s skewed appointments in a column article titled Yorubanisation (The Sun, 21 September 2023):
“The President, through the skewed appointments, is on a gamble. And, like every gambling attempt, this can lead – and we pray that it does – to a windfall that will benefit Nigeria. On the other hand, heavens forbid, it could become a spectacular failure that hurts the economy further while inextricably tainting the image of the Yoruba….May it not happen that tomorrow, the proud Yoruba race will be forced to enjoy the same negative image that Muhammadu Buhari bequeathed to his Fulani people through a similar (nepotistic) policy.”
From my analyst’s point of view, the future of a Tinubu presidency that does not admit citizen feedback appears bleak.